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699 
SETTLING FOR SETTLEMENT:  
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S NEW  
CARTEL SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cartels, or agreements between competitors that restrain competition, 
have long been a problem for free-market economies. In The Wealth of 
Nations, Adam Smith observed that ―[p]eople of the same trade seldom 
meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation 
ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise 
prices.‖1 In Smith‘s lifetime, there were no laws against such 
conspiracies.
2
 Now, cartels are considered ―the supreme evil of antitrust.‖3 
Traditionally, the United States has led the way in enforcing antitrust 
laws.
4
 But recently, European regulators have reinvigorated efforts against 
anticompetitive cartel behavior. For instance, the European Commission 
recently fined a group of marine hose makers $173 million for an 
international conspiracy to rig bids, allocate markets, and fix prices on 
their products.
5
 
 
 
 1. Adam Smith Institute, Adam Smith Quotes, http://www.adamsmith.org/adam-smith-quotes/ 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2010) (quoting 4 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 145 (1776)). 
 2. John Steele Gordon, Contrivances to Raise Prices, BARRON‘S, Dec. 31, 2007, http://online. 
barrons.com/article/SB119889902533357267.html?mod=googlenews_barrons. 
 3. Thomas O. Barnett, Seven Steps to Better Cartel Enforcement, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION 
LAW ANNUAL 2006: ENFORCEMENT OF PROHIBITION OF CARTELS 141, 141 (Claus Dieter Ehlermann & 
Isabela Atanasiu eds., 2007) (quoting Verizon Commc‘ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004)). 
 4. See, e.g., Donald C. Klawiter, US Corporate Leniency After the Blockbuster Cartels: Are We 
Entering a New Era?, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2006: ENFORCEMENT OF 
PROHIBITION OF CARTELS, supra note 3, at 489 (pointing out various jurisdictions that have imitated 
United States antitrust policies). 
 5. Christine Caulfield, EC Fines Marine Hose Makers $173M in Cartel Probe, LAW 360, Jan. 
28, 2009, http://competition.law360.com/print_article/84907; Press Release, European Comm‘n, 
Antitrust: Commission Fines Marine Hose Producers €131 Million for Market Sharing and Price-
Fixing Cartel (Jan. 28, 2009), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/137& 
guiLanguage=de. The marine hose case involved an agreement between five firms: Japan‘s 
Bridgestone Corp. (fined $76.8 million); Sweden‘s Trelleborg (fined $32.1 million); Britain‘s Dunlop 
Oil and Marine (a unit of Germany‘s Continental Group AG) (fined $23.6 million); Italy‘s Parker ITR 
SRL (fined $33.5 million); and Italy‘s Manuli Rubber Industries SPA (fined $6.4 million). According 
to European Competition Commissioner, Neelie Kroes, this cartel lasted twenty years and ―added to 
the prices consumers paid for their oil deliveries.‖ Id. The EC said that Bridgestone and Parker 
received the harshest penalties because they led the cartel. The Japanese company, Yokohama Rubber 
Co., also participated in the cartel, but won full immunity from fines through the Commission‘s 
leniency program, which is discussed below. Id. 
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High profile cases, like the marine hose prosecution, reflect Europe‘s 
effort, beginning in the early 2000s, to modernize antitrust enforcement, 
especially by concentrating on combating cartels.
6
 But even with 
competition regulation, secret agreements to illegally control prices, 
markets, and bids remain as problematic as ever in the European Common 
Market. Such conduct constitutes ―the most egregious violations of 
competition law which injure consumers in many countries by raising 
prices and restricting supply, thus making goods and services completely 
unavailable to some purchasers and unnecessarily expensive for others.‖7 
As the European Union continues to crack down on cartel activity 
using serious penalties to punish and deter such behavior,
8
 businesses in 
the European market
9
 must understand and follow European competition 
rules in order to avoid or minimize fines resulting from a European 
 
 
 6. See Mario Monti, The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION 
LAW ANNUAL 2000 3, 5 (Claus Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu eds., 2001). 
 7. Julian M. Joshua, Leniency in U.S. and EU Cartel Cases, 14 ANTITRUST 19, 19 (2000) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). To understand why cartels form, it is helpful to look to basic 
economic principles. Producers have an incentive to form cartels because doing so reduces 
competition and allows them to earn higher profits than if perfect competition existed. DAVID 
BESANKO & RONALD R. BRAEUTIGAM, MICROECONOMICS 433 (2d ed. 2005). Cartel behavior is 
harmful to the economy because it restrains the market, preventing efficient allocation of resources. 
Economists agree that when a market operates freely, firms will produce their most efficient level of 
output, see id. at 186 (explaining why ―competition breeds efficiency‖), and consumers will pay the 
most efficient price, id. at 356–57 (explaining that the efficient allocation of resources ―maximizes net 
economic benefits‖). But if producers form a cartel in a market, they will collusively determine the 
price and output, thereby preventing market forces from operating. Id. at 430. Thus, deadweight loss 
results, reducing total economic benefit. Id. Deadweight loss is ―the difference between the net 
economic benefit that would arise if the market were perfectly competitive and the net economic 
benefit attained at the monopoly equilibrium.‖ Id. Consumers are harmed because prices remain 
artificially high. Id. Significantly, cartels can also act as barriers to entry for other producers. Id. at 
435.  
 Moreover, cartelists themselves waste resources by spending time, money, and energy to 
organizing, avoiding detection, and keeping others out of the group. These resources would be better 
spent on producing more goods and services for consumption. VALENTINE KORAH, AN 
INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE 12 (Hart Publishing 2007) (1988).  
 8. The role of government is especially important in the current financial crisis. The European 
Commission has indicated that competition enforcement will remain vigorous during the current 
recession. See European Commission, The Contribution of Competition Policy to Economic Recovery, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/recovery/index.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2010) (noting that 
competition rules will be enforced during the crisis to protect healthy companies). 
 9. Article 101 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union extends coverage of competition policy to companies whose agreements ―may affect trade 
between Member States.‖ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 101, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:EN:PDF [hereinafter Consolidated Treaty].  
 Note that the articles on competition law were renumbered with the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty in December 2009. Article 81 is now article 101, and article 82 is now article 102. European 
Commission, Changes After the Entry Into Force of the Treaty of Lisbon, available at http://ec.europa. 
eu/competition/information/treaty.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss4/6
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Commission investigation into their practices.
10
 To assist firms with 
compliance, antitrust regulators have developed mutually beneficial 
leniency (or amnesty) programs. Leniency allows regulators to offer 
immunity to a violator of article 101 in exchange for disclosing 
information on the cartel and cooperating with the investigation. Leniency 
programs not only benefit cooperative firms, but they also promote the 
regulators‘ goal of deterring anticompetitive behavior by increasing the 
risk of cartel activity and by making cooperation and compliance more 
attractive.
11
  
In accordance with the goal of deterrence and to expedite resolution of 
violations charges, in June 2008, the European Commission‘s antitrust 
section, the Directorate General of Competition (―DG Comp‖), introduced 
a new settlement procedure for cartels.
12
 The settlement program, offered 
at the DG Comp‘s discretion at the end of an investigation, is distinct from 
the leniency program. The settlement procedure provides cartel members 
the chance to assess adverse evidence and forgo litigation by settling their 
cases, in exchange for a ten percent reduction in fines otherwise 
imposed.
13
 The procedure aims to free up resources and save time by 
providing the DG Comp with a shortened way of resolving clear 
violations.
14
 DG Comp prosecutors hope to be able to open new 
investigations in the time they save. Overall, this goal is based on the 
theory that a more efficient DG Comp will reinforce deterrence and 
thereby promote market compliance with antitrust laws.
15
  
But will the new settlement procedure really deter cartel formation and 
operation? This Note will explore the background, scope, and 
effectiveness of the European Commission‘s antitrust regulatory powers, 
 
 
 10. KORAH, supra note 7, at 37–38. The European Commission‘s competence extends to 
―undertakings that have intentionally or negligently infringed the competition rules . . . . Ignorance of 
the law is no excuse . . . .‖ Id. 
 11. See generally Klawiter, supra note 4, at 489–92 (discussing the goals and mechanics of the 
U.S. leniency program). 
 12. Commission Regulation 622/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 171) 3, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:171:0003:0005:en:PDF.   
 13. Press Release, European Comm‘n, Antitrust: Commission Adopts First Cartel Settlement 
Decision—Questions & Answers, 1–2 (May 19, 2010), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction. 
do?reference=MEMO/10/201&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (explaining 
that the reduction is calculated as ten percent of the guideline fine). 
 14. Commission Regulation 622/2008, supra note 12, at 3.  
 15. See generally Ann O‘Brien, Senior Counsel to the Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. for 
Criminal Enforcement, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice Antitrust Div., Cartel Settlements in the U.S. and EU: 
Similarities, Differences & Remaining Questions 6–7 (June 6, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj. 
gov/atr/public/speeches/235598.htm (explaining goals of cartel settlement). 
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especially its power to regulate cartels.
16
 This includes a discussion of the 
DG Comp‘s regulatory toolkit, including potential fines, the amnesty 
program, and the settlement procedure introduced in June of 2008. The 
Note predicts that the new settlement procedure, which has only been 
successfully used once since its inception,
17
 will not make the European 
Commission a more efficient regulator. Therefore, the new procedure will 
not achieve its goal of promoting deterrence. The Note concludes by 
suggesting alternate methods of achieving the DG Comp‘s goals.  
II. BACKGROUND: EUROPEAN COMMISSION ANTITRUST AUTHORITY AND 
JURISDICTION 
A. The European Commission as an Antitrust Enforcer 
The European Commission, the law-making body of the EU,
18
 is 
empowered with broad jurisdiction
19
 by the Treaty on the Functioning of 
 
 
 16. The European Commission also regulates antitrust violations for abuse of dominant market 
position. See KORAH, supra note 7, at 133–212; Consolidated Treaty, supra note 9, art. 102 (formerly 
Treaty of the European Union art. 82). The most well known example of the Commission‘s work in 
this area has been its recent prosecution of Microsoft. See, e.g., Kevin J. O‘Brien, Questions About 
Timing of Europe’s New Microsoft Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/ 
01/20/technology/20soft.html?_r=1&ref=business. However, dominant market position violations are 
beyond the scope of this note. 
 17. Press Release, European Comm‘n, Antitrust: Commission Fines DRAM Producers €331 
Million for Price Cartel; Reaches First Settlement in a Cartel Case (May 19, 2010), http://europa.eu/ 
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/586. 
 18. When the European Economic Community was formed in 1958, it included only six Member 
States. KORAH, supra note 7, at 2. Today there are twenty-seven Member States. See Member States of 
the EU, http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/eu_members/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 
2010). The European Commission is the EU body that ―uphold[s] the interests of the Union as a 
whole.‖ EU Institutions and Other Bodies, http://europa.eu/institutions/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 
21, 2010). Each Member State appoints one member to the Commission, each of whom is required to 
act entirely independently of their national interests. KORAH, supra note 7, at 26.   
 19. The European Commission‘s broad jurisdiction is evidenced by the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (―ECJ‖) decision in the Wood Pulp case. There, the ECJ adopted the 
traditional territorial theory of international law, holding ―that if a contract made by non[-EU] 
nationals outside the Common Market is implemented within [the EU], the Commission is competent 
[to prosecute].‖ KORAH, supra note 7, at 35.  
 Indeed, the Wood Pulp Court‘s ―implementation theory‖ may have expanded the breadth of 
jurisdiction further than the ―effects doctrine,‖ which traditionally limited jurisdiction to cases only 
where anticompetitive effects are reasonably foreseen to be immediate and substantial. Id. 
 Though the European Commission has broad jurisdiction, it is not the only regulator within the 
Common Market. Each member state in the EU has its own antitrust regulators and policy, but is 
required to enforce the Consolidated Treaty provision on cartels. See KORAH, supra note 7, at 243; 
Consolidated Treaty, supra note 9, art. 101. National competition authorities are charged with the duty 
of enforcing national competition laws, which mirror article 101 to a large extent. KORAH, supra note 
7, at 245. In cases where there may be an effect on trade between Member States, national 
enforcement authorities and courts that apply national competition law to such conduct must also be 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss4/6
  
 
 
 
 
2010] SETTLING FOR SETTLEMENT 703 
 
 
 
 
the European Union to regulate anticompetitive activity.
20
 Specifically, 
article 101 of the Treaty
21
 empowers the European Commission to bring 
enforcement actions against cartels that affect trade between Member 
States.
22
 The DG Comp is the bureau of the European Commission that is 
dedicated to enforcing European competition laws,
23
 and it is headed by a 
Commissioner.
24
 It has ―the authority to issue implementing regulations 
and decisions that establish law.‖25 In further accordance with article 101 
of the Treaty, the DG Comp also prosecutes collusive practices considered 
inconsistent with the principles of the Common Market.
26
 This includes 
 
 
consistent with article 101. Id. at 246. This requirement is recited in article 3 of Regulation 1/2003, 
which prescribes uniform application throughout the Member States. Id. (citing Council Regulation 
1/2003, art. 3, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 8 (EC)). But national authorities can lose their powers to enforce 
article 101 if the DG Comp decides to take up a case. Id. at 249. However, this only occurs when 
multiple Member States are affected by an infringement. Id. at 249–50. 
 20. Consolidated Treaty, supra note 9, arts. 101, 102. Regulation of anticompetitive activity is 
crucial to achieving the goal of improving living conditions and expanding the goal of a European free 
market economy unimpeded by national boundaries. KORAH, supra note 7, at 8 (explaining the 
benefits of an integrated Common Market). A free market system provides the advantage of 
encouraging firms to efficiently produce what people want to buy, such that the ―consumer is king.‖ 
Id. at 11. As the European Market has grown and thrived, the European Community Treaty removed 
customs barriers and quotas. Id. at 3. 
 But it should be noted that promotion of competition is not the exclusive goal of the European 
Common Market. Rather, market integration has been a primary goal, and has sometimes led to 
reduced competition. See id. at 8. 
 21. Article 101 of the Consolidated Treaty addresses collusion that restricts competition. Article 
101(1) prohibits, ―as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements between undertakings, 
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between 
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the internal market . . . .‖ Consolidated Treaty, supra note 9, art. 101(1); see also 
KORAH, supra note 7, at 4 (quoting article 81(1)). Article 101(2) provides that agreements that infringe 
article 101 are void, and article 101(3) provides some exceptions. KORAH, supra note 7, at 5. Article 
101(1) agreements are the focus of this Note. 
 22. KORAH, supra note 7, at 66 (―The condition that trade between Member States be affected is 
easily satisfied.‖). 
 23. European Commission—Directorate General for Competition, Mission Statement, http://ec. 
europa.eu/dgs/competition/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2010). European Commission 
regulations are similar to administrative regulations in the United States. RALPH H. FOLSOM, 
EUROPEAN UNION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 38 (5th ed. 2005).  
 24. FOLSOM, supra note 23, at 66. Commissioners are charged with a duty to the European 
Union, and not to their home country. Id. The outgoing Commissioner of the DG Comp is Dutch 
national Neelie Kroes (her replacement, Joaquin Alumnia took office in January 2010). Commissioner 
Kroes has stated that: ―[m]y job is about acting as a referee [of the effort to preserve the Single 
Market]. If we think of the European economy as a football match: I set and enforce the rules of the 
game, in conjunction with the other Commissioners. We make sure it is a fair match, and that there is 
punishment for people and companies that break the rules and spoil the game for others.‖ European 
Commissioner for Competition—Neelie Kroes—What I Do, http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_ 
2004–2009/kroes/whatido_en.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).  
 25. FOLSOM, supra note 23, at 64–65 (explaining the Commission‘s pivotal law-making role). 
 26. KORAH, supra note 7, at 3 (―Article 81 forbids, as incompatible with the Common Market, 
collusion between undertakings . . .‖). Article 102 (formerly article 82), which forbids the ―abusive 
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agreements which, by their object or effect, prevent, restrict, or distort 
competition within the Common Market.
27
 Article 101 has been used to 
challenge ―joint buying, joint selling, joint ventures and strategic alliances, 
and data exchanges‖ between horizontal competitors, as well as activities 
between vertically related suppliers, manufacturers, and franchisees or 
distributors.
28
 As in the United States, these prosecutions begin with 
detailed investigations into a company‘s behavior.29  
B. Fines and Leniency: Sticks and Carrots of Enforcement 
One way the DG Comp enforces anti-cartel policies is by using the 
―stick‖ of heavy fines against high profile corporations.30 The revenue 
 
 
exploitation of a dominant position,‖ is the other key competition law of the EC. Conduct may violate 
both. Id. However, Article 82 is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 27. Consolidated Treaty, supra note 9, art. 101; see also KORAH, supra note 7, at 44 (quoting 
then Article 81(1)). Article 101(1) continues by prohibiting ―in particular those [agreements] which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; (b) limit or 
control production, markets, technical development or investment; (c) share markets or sources of 
supply; (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; [and] (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to 
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.‖ Consolidated Treaty, supra 
note 9, art. 101(1). 
 28. FOLSOM, supra note 23, at 302.  
 29. The DG Comp has authority under Regulation 1/2003 to conduct investigations of economic 
sectors or of individual business and trade associations. Id. at 304. These investigations have several 
steps. First, many begin with notorious ―dawn raids‖ during which the Commission investigators gain 
hostile access to a business premises to search documents for signs of article 101 violations. Id. at 305. 
Second, businesses under investigation have some right to notice and hearing, but do not have access 
to the case file. Id. Failure to comply with the investigation subjects the corporation to civil penalties, 
but not its board of directors personally. Id. at 306. Third, ―[b]efore deciding that a competition law 
breach has occurred, the Commission issues a statement of ‗objections‘.‖ Id. at 309. This document 
must set forth all the facts that the Commission will rely on in prosecuting the case. Id. The parties in 
question then may request a hearing. Id. These hearings are private and the Commission only needs to 
disclose documents it will use and those which are needed for creating a defense. Id. The Commission 
does not make public the identities of the targets of statements of objections. Id. Nonetheless the 
information often is leaked or the parties admit that they are targets. A recent example occurred in 
December 2008 when ABB Ltd., Areva SA, Toshiba Corp., and Seimens AG told the press about their 
involvement with the Commission‘s investigation into the electronic transformers manufacturers. 
Brendan Pierson, EU Charges Toshiba, Siemens, ABB In Cartel Probe, LAW 360, Dec. 11, 2008, 
http://competition.law360.com/print_article/79882. The final step is when the Commission renders an 
enforcement decision, which is made public. FOLSOM, supra note 23, at 310.  
 30. In recent decisions, the Commission has levied, and the Court has upheld, substantial fines 
against firms that violate antitrust law. FOLSOM, supra note 23, at 310–11. For example, in 2001 the 
DG Comp imposed a judgment of $850 million on a cartel in the vitamins industry. Id. Also, ―[i]n 
January, February and April [of 2007] the commission imposed heavy fines on the members of three 
large cartels: the ‗gas insulated switchgear cartel‘, ‗the lift cartel‘ and the ‗Dutch beer cartel‘, totaling 
750 million, 990 million and 273 million euros respectively‖ (which is more than €2 billion total). 
Michel Debroux & Janet L. McDavid, EU Targets Cartels, NAT‘L L.J., June 18, 2007, at 1. More 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss4/6
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from these fines helps offset the dues that member states in the EU 
regularly pay. Large fines against high-profile firms may enhance the DG 
Comp‘s reputation, but no part of the money is used to finance the 
institution of the DG Comp.
31
 For this reason, from an enforcement 
perspective, well-publicized fines are most useful because of their 
deterrent effect.
32
  
For violations of article 101, the Commission has the power to impose 
fines of up to ten percent of an infringing firm‘s prior year‘s turnover.33 If 
the cartel‘s infringement has relatively small affects, the amount of the 
fine may be reduced in accordance with the doctrine of proportionality.
34
 
Conversely, aggravating factors may increase the fine. For example, firms 
that had long participated in a cartel and firms with previous antitrust 
violations are subject to a higher penalty.
35
  
Like the United States, where regulators may impose criminal penalties 
for antitrust infringements,
36
 certain European Member State national 
governments also provide for criminal penalties such as prison sentences 
 
 
recently, in November 2008, the Commission levied a record fine of €1.4 billion against a glassmaking 
cartel. See David Gow, Glassmakers Fined Record €1.4bn for Price-Fixing by European Regulators, 
GUARDIAN, Nov. 13, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/nov/13/regulators. 
 31. Press Release, European Comm‘n, Competition: Revised Commission Guidelines for Setting 
Fines in Antitrust Cases—Frequently Asked Questions (June 28, 2006), http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/256&format=HTML&aged=O&language=EN&guiLan
guage=en (explaining what happens to the proceeds from fines).  
 32. See FOLSOM, supra note 23, at 310. In fact, the goal of promoting deterrence was the main 
reason the Commission‘s fining power was enhanced in September of 2006. See Debroux & McDavid, 
supra note 30, at 1 (highlighting innovations of the ―tougher‖ September 2006 fining guidelines). 
 33. KORAH, supra note 7, at 38. For example, in one case, Pioneer, the European Court of Justice 
―confirmed that the 10% limit may be based on the turnover of the entire group of companies, 
worldwide and for all products.‖ Id. Also, the definition of ―turnover‖ in corporate finance is ―the ratio 
of annual sales to net worth, representing the extent to which a company can grow without outside 
capital.‖ Yahoo Finance Glossary, http://biz.yahoo.com/f/g/tt.html#ca (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).  
 34. KORAH, supra note 7, at 38. Though fines are useful enforcement tools, when imposing fines, 
regulators have to balance effectiveness and deterrence against justice and proportionality. They must 
consider the economic fact that fines are not without social cost. But regulators should set high 
penalties to ensure that the costs outweigh the benefits. The cost of enforcement and the possibility of 
legal error should also be considered. See Nadia Calviño, Public Enforcement in the EU: Deterrent 
Effect and Proportionality of Fines, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2006: ENFORCEMENT 
OF PROHIBITION OF CARTELS, supra note 3, at 317, 318. 
 35. The Commission recently added three elements that have the potential to increase the amount 
of fines: first, the Commission will determine the fine‘s basic amount by a percentage of the revenues 
generated by the cartel behavior; second, the duration of the cartel incurs penalties of up to 100% per 
year; and third, the basic fine against that firm can be increased by up to 100% by either the 
Commission or a national government for each previous Article 101 or 102 violation. Debroux & 
McDavid, supra note 30, at 2–3.  
 36. Interestingly, in the Marine Hose case, the United States Department of Justice Antitrust 
Division, after a joint raid with the European Commission in May 2007, has succeeded so far in 
securing prison sentences for nine executives involved in the conspiracies and criminal fines of five 
figures or more. See Caulfield, supra note 5. 
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in cartel cases.
37
 However, unlike its American counterpart, Sherman Act 
section 1,
38
 article 101 does not authorize the European Commission to 
impose criminal penalties.
39
 
In conjunction with fines, another effective enforcement tool of the EC 
has been its leniency program.
40
 Essentially, leniency offers the ―carrot‖ of 
total immunity or reduced fines to the first cartel member to give 
regulators information about the cartel‘s operation.41 By creating a 
 
 
 37. See INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, Cartel Settlements 39 (2008), available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc347.pdf (demonstrating that 
Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom all allow for some criminal penalties for antirust 
infringements). 
 38. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (―Every person who shall make any contract or engage in 
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .‖). 
 39. See Wouter P.J. Wils, Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer?, in EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2006: ENFORCEMENT OF PROHIBITION OF CARTELS, supra note 3, at 267, 
311–12 (pointing out the legal feasibility of criminal antitrust enforcement at the level of EU 
institutions). 
 There is currently an interesting debate about the relative merits of corporate fines versus prison 
sentences for antitrust violations. See id. at 291 (discussing five arguments in favor of imprisonment); 
see also Stephen Calkins, Coming to Praise Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, in EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2006: ENFORCEMENT OF PROHIBITION OF CARTELS, supra note 3, at 343. 
While this debate is largely beyond the scope of this paper, prison sentences seem to be a more 
effective way of deterring cartel behavior because criminal penalties hold directors personally 
responsible for their illegal behavior. Id. at 344 (emphasizing that ―individual liability results in greater 
deterrence‖). Meanwhile, one possible detriment of corporate fines is that consumers, who are 
supposed to benefit from antitrust regulation, will end up paying the fine indirectly through higher 
prices. But see Massimo Motta, On Cartel Deterrence and Fines in the European Union, 29 EUR. 
COMPETITION L. REV., 209, 217 (expressing the opinion that this concern is a myth). 
 40. See Commission Notice on Immunity From Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, 
2006 O.J. (C298) 17, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006: 
298:0017:0022:EN:PDF; see also European Commission, Leniency http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
cartels/leniency/leniency.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).  
 41. European Commission, supra note 40. Full leniency is available to cartel members who: ―[1)] 
inform the Commission of the . . . cartel BEFORE the Commission has undertaken an investigation[, 
provided the Commission does not have information already; 2) are] the FIRST to adduce decisive 
evidence of the cartel; [3)] immediately end its involvement in the cartel; [4)] provide the Commission 
with all relevant . . . evidence available to the applicant [as well as] maintain continuous and complete 
cooperation throughout the investigation; and [5) have not] compelled another company to take part in 
the cartel or acted as an instigator . . . .‖ Joshua, supra note 7, at 21. 
 The fifth criteria is consistent with common notions of fairness: ―A company could strongly 
persuade other firms to take part in a cartel without actually coercing them, and then turn around and 
‗blow the whistle‘ on these other firms, inflicting damage on them. . . . [A] leniency programme 
should never protect or reward such behaviour.‖ David Henry, Leniency Programmes: An Anaemic 
Carrot for Cartels in France, Germany and the UK?, 26 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 13, 23 n.59 
(2005). 
 If full immunity from fines is not possible, in the EC a cartel member may be eligible for a 
reduction of fines if and to the extent that the cartelist provides information of evidence of ―significant 
added value.‖ ―The level of reduction declines with the order of application: between 30% and 50% 
for the second applicant, between 20% and 30% for the third applicant and no more than 20% for the 
subsequent applicants.‖ Debroux & McDavid, supra note 30, at 2.  
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powerful incentive for each cartelist to be disloyal, leniency increases the 
risk of cartel behavior thereby deterring cartel participation. The program 
has been quite effective.
42
 Indeed, the program has encouraged firms to 
self-regulate for antitrust violations.
43
 In a significant way, it has also 
allowed the DG Comp to become more efficient: the information provided 
by leniency applicants saves the DG Comp the trouble of conducting full 
investigations.
44
  
C. The Directorate General of Competition: A Victim of Its Own Success 
The successful leniency program has been both a blessing and a curse 
for the DG Comp.
45
 On one hand, as noted above, leniency has promoted 
deterrence by incentivizing individual cartel members to be disloyal and 
inform on fellow members. On the other hand, the attractiveness of the 
leniency program has caused a flood of leniency applications. In fact, 
these applications are overwhelming the DG Comp workforce, which 
 
 
 The EC leniency program currently is distinct from leniency programs that exist in the various EU 
Member States. See Margaret Bloom, Despite Its Great Success, the EC Leniency Programme Faces 
Great Challenges, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2006: ENFORCEMENT OF PROHIBITION 
OF CARTELS, supra note 3, at 543, 543. The existence of distinct leniency programs in various 
jurisdictions has caused difficulty for multinational firms. Companies need to file applications in each 
jurisdiction, and hire local experts to handle the dealing with the agencies. With a view toward 
resolving this difficulty, the European Commission has proposed a ―one-stop shop‖ for leniency that 
would allow a leniency application in the EC to provide immunity across all Member States. See 
Klawiter, supra note 4, at 506–07; see also Neelie Kroes, The First Hundred Days (Apr. 7, 2005), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/205.  
 42. The leniency program has attracted many applicants. As of July 12, 2006, the Commission 
reports receiving 167 applications since its inception in 2002. Press Release, European Comm‘n, 
Competition: Commission Leniency Notice—Frequently Asked Questions (Dec. 7, 2006), http:// 
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/470&format=HTML&aged=0&langua
ge=EN&guiLanguage=en.  
 43. An example of the leniency program in action is the fines against a cartel of banana 
producers in July 2007. The EC imposed fines of €60.3 million on banana importers Dole and 
Weichery for participating in a price-fixing cartel with Chiquita. Chiquita was granted immunity 
because it initially reported the cartel, which operated from 2000–2002. The investigation of the price-
fixing arrangement began in April 2005 after Chiquita came forward to the EU and applied for 
immunity under the EU‘s leniency program. Christie Smythe, EU Fines Dole, Others $80M for Fixing 
Banana Prices, LAW 360, Oct. 15, 2008, http://competition.law360.com/articles/72808.  
 44. See Julian M. Joshua, That Uncertain Feeling: The Commission’s 2002 Leniency Notice, in 
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2006: ENFORCEMENT OF PROHIBITION OF CARTELS, supra 
note 3, at 511, 511 (―Commission officials laud the success of its leniency programme in exposing 
huge price fixing cartels that would otherwise have remained undetected.‖). 
 45. John Ratliff, Plea Bargaining in EC Anti-Cartel Enforcement—A System Change?, in 
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2006: ENFORCEMENT OF PROHIBITION OF CARTELS, supra 
note 3, at 597, 598. Ratliff notes that ―Commission cartel proceedings usually take years and 
considerable resources, even with amnesty/leniency. . . . [C]learly it is not a good result, if cases are 
coming in faster, creating an even greater backlog.‖ Id. 
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already had its hands full.
46
 Though responsible for a large jurisdiction, the 
European Commission is a relatively small governmental body: in fact, 
―[t]here are fewer officials working for the Commission in all departments 
than are employed by any one of the major departments of the UK civil 
service.‖47 Moreover, within the Commission, the DG Comp is a relatively 
small bureau.
48
 Therefore, there is legitimate concern that a DG Comp 
overburdened by leniency applications is less able to carry out its essential 
tasks, such as investigations into the market.
49
  
D. Direct Settlement: An Attempt at Solving Problems and Promoting 
Goals 
On June 30, 2008, the Commission introduced Regulation 622/2008, 
which provides for direct settlement.
50
 The purpose of direct settlement is 
 
 
 46. Christopher M. Brown, The Emergence of “Administrative Settlements” in EU and UK 
Cartel Cases, LexisNexis Emerging Issues Analysis 3 (2008), available at 2008 Emerging Issues 2410 
(LEXIS). Brown notes the discouraging ratio of leniency applicants to decisions: ―the Commission 
itself recently reported that, by the end of 2006, 104 companies applied for immunity from financial 
penalty [under the Commission‘s current leniency program] and a further 99 for a reduction in the fine. 
During that same period, the Commission issued just 7 cartel decisions affecting 41 undertakings.‖ Id.; 
see also Joshua, supra note 44, at 511 (noting ―the statistics reveal that the Commission risks being 
overwhelmed by the sheer numbers [and] the current system is overstretched‖). 
 Moreover, dealing with leniency applications involves time-consuming tasks: ―there are 
applicants‘ statements to be taken, ‗dawn raids‘, requests for information, witness statements, 
Statements of Objections, hearings, confidentiality reviews, evidentiary reviews and complex fining 
considerations to evaluate, resulting in detailed decisions, often with hundreds of footnotes and files 
which often contain thousands of pages. Clearly there are also related translations and, since there are 
numerous defendants, much of this has to be done in multiple versions.‖ Ratliff, supra note 45, at 598; 
see Joshua, supra note 44, at 511. 
 47. KORAH, supra note 7, at 27.   
 48. Certain DG‘s seem to have too few staff members, while others have been criticized as being 
overstaffed. FOLSOM, supra note 23, at 68. To its credit, the DG Comp has streamlined its procedures 
so as to deal with an average cartel case within 24–30 months. However, ―[w]ith 45 case handlers 
working in case teams of two people . . . production capacity is at best around 10 decisions per year 
. . . .‖ Olivier Guersent, The EU Model of Administrative Enforcement Against Global Cartels: 
Evolving to Meet Challenges, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2006: ENFORCEMENT OF 
PROHIBITION OF CARTELS, supra note 3, at 213, 216. 
 ―Although cartels are high on the [DG Comp‘s] agenda, internal staffing decisions have to take 
account of competing priorities, notably in state aid and mergers, as well as the need to enforce non-
cartel Article [101] and [102] work and to perform a number of basic functions of market surveillance, 
including the detection of cartels not reported through leniency or sector inquiries.‖ Id.  
 49. KORAH, supra note 7, at 27 (stating ―there is not [enough] manpower for much regulation‖). 
The lack of resources could promote anticompetitive behavior in the European Union, because 
insufficient risks will exist to deter such behavior: ―If companies begin to think it a viable option to 
stay out and gamble that the Commission will not be able to build a case against it, the status of the 
Commission as an antitrust agency will diminish.‖ Joshua, supra note 44, at 540. 
 50. Commission Regulation 622/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 171) 3. Regulation 622/2008 sets out 
procedures for resolving article 101 and article 102 violations. See also Commission Notice on the 
Conduct of Settlement Procedures in View of the Adoption of Decisions Pursuant to Article 7 and 
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to alleviate the backlog of pending cases
51
 resulting from the success of 
the DG Comp‘s leniency program. The DG Comp hopes direct settlement 
will not only alleviate the strain,
52
 but also deter cartel behavior.
53
 
Like the leniency program, direct settlement seeks to reward cartelists 
that cooperate with regulators. Unlike the leniency program, settlement is 
available only after initial investigation when the DG Comp has obtained 
enough evidence to bring an enforcement action.
54
 The settlement 
process
55
 allows cartelists to see the evidence against them
56
 and to be 
informed of the range of potential fines.
57
 At this point a cartelist may opt 
to forego defending an enforcement action and instead acknowledge 
liability.
58
 In return, the DG Comp may reward the cartelist‘s 
 
 
Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in Cartel Cases, 2008 O.J. (C 167) 1, 1–12 
[hereinafter Conduct of Settlement Procedures Notice].  
 According to the Conduct of Settlement Procedures Notice, ―The settlement procedure may allow 
the Commission to handle more cases with the same resources, thereby fostering the public interest in 
the Commission‘s delivery of effective and timely punishment, while increasing overall deterrence.‖ 
Id. at 1.  
 51. Ratliff, supra note 45, at 598.  
 52. Neelie Kroes expressed concern that the Commission may not be able to deliver swift 
enforcement with timely punishment in her speech ―The First Hundred Days‖ on April 7, 2005. Kroes, 
supra note 41, at 5. There, Kroes introduced the idea that became direct settlement: ―we may need to 
look at how some form of plea bargaining procedure could bring advantages.‖ Ratliff, supra note 45, 
at 597 (quoting Kroes, supra note 41, at 5).  
 53. Conduct of Settlement Procedures Notice, supra note 50, at 1. A valid concern seems to be 
that the backlog of cases could inspire a sense of security amongst cartelists. See Guersent, supra note 
48, at 216. Theoretically, removing the backlog would eliminate this possible incentive to form cartels. 
See id. 
 54. O‘Brien, supra note 15, at 6. So, unlike a leniency applicant, a direct settlement applicant 
does not offer substantial assistance intended to trigger or advance an investigation. Id. 
 The DG Comp is hopeful that direct settlement will reduce the work in the same way that plea 
bargaining has in the United States. KORAH, supra note 7, at 472. 
 55. Conduct of Settlement Procedures Notice, supra note 50; see also Michael Reynolds et al., 
Antitrust Developments: The EU Leniency Programme, 11–12 (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.abanet. 
org/antitrust/at-committees/at-ic/pdf/spring/09/reynolds.pdf. The process of settlement takes place as 
follows: after the Commission has completed its investigation of a cartel, it issues a statement of 
objections to each party. If the Commission decides to allow settlement discussions to take place, the 
parties declare in writing that they will participate. Conduct of Settlement Procedures Notice, supra 
note 50. Third parties ―such as complainants will not be granted access to settlement submissions.‖ Id. 
at 5.  
 56. Id. at 5, 2.  
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. Regulation 622/2008 contemplates that parties will submit their acknowledgments in 
writing. Id. at 2. The parties must file a formal request to settle in the form of a ―settlement 
submission‖ which must contain an acknowledgment in clear and unequivocal terms of the parties‘ 
liability for the infringement, including facts about the parties‘ roles and the duration of their 
participation in the infringement. Id. at 3–4. Also the settlement submission must contain the 
maximum amount of the fine the parties would accept. Id. Finally, the settlement submission must 
confirm that the parties have had a sufficient opportunity to make their views known to the 
Commission and that they will not request another hearing. Id.  
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acknowledgement by reducing the amount of the fine otherwise imposed 
by ten percent.
59
 In sum, a direct settlement allows an admitted cartelist to 
waive certain procedural rights
60
 in order to save money and time.
61
 
The DG Comp retains a large amount of discretion in deciding whether 
to explore the settlement procedure in cartel cases.
62
 Indeed, the Conduct 
of Settlement Procedures Notice makes clear that the Commission does 
not negotiate the question of the existence of an infringement of 
Community law or the appropriate sanction amount.
63
 At any time, the 
Commission may choose to discontinue settlement discussions with one or 
more of the parties involved.
64
 
Interestingly, the Commission takes precautions to ensure that the 
choice of the settlement procedure cannot be imposed on the parties.
65
 
Parties are protected if settlement is not reached; the Commission will not 
use acknowledgements as evidence in any proceedings.
66
  
III. ANALYSIS 
Since June 2008, the direct settlement procedure has been used once to 
resolve a cartel case involving memory chip producers.
67
 Thus, this is 
largely a prospective analysis of the settlement procedure‘s potential to 
achieve the goals of efficiency and deterrence.
68
 The discussion is guided 
 
 
 As for the timing of the acknowledgment, initiation of proceedings may occur no later than the 
date when the Commission issues a statement of objections against the parties concerned. Id. at 2.  
 59. Id. at 5.  
 60. O‘Brien, supra note 15, at 7. The Commission‘s settlement procedure provides for a waiver 
of certain procedural rights such as access to the file, a formal hearing, and a translation. Id. It does not 
require a waiver of the right to appeal. Id. at 9. 
 61. Id. at 6 (noting that a goal is to resolve cartel cases quickly). 
 62. Factors in the determination include the likelihood of achieving procedural efficiencies and 
the possibility of setting a precedent. Conduct of Settlement Procedures Notice, supra note 50, at 2. 
 63. Id. at 1. 
 64. Id. at 2. For example, the Commission may choose to discontinue settlement, if it seems that 
there is a low probability of reaching a common understanding regarding the scope of the violation. If 
any party fails to follow the settlement procedure, or breaches its commitment, the Commission will 
―take note‖ and may also disregard the party‘s request to enter into the settlement procedure. Id. at 4. If 
at any point settlement breaks down, ―[t]he Commission retains the right to adopt a statement of 
objections which does not reflect the parties‘ settlement submission.‖ Id. at 4. 
 65. Id. at 1. The parties may call upon a Hearing Officer at any time in the process regarding any 
issue of due process. Id. at 3. 
 66. Id. at 4. ―The acknowledgments provided by the parties . . . could not be used in evidence 
against any of the parties to the proceedings.‖ Id. 
 67. Press Release, European Comm‘n, supra note 17. 
 68. Because the settlement procedure has only been used once as of June 2008, the analysis is 
speculative. One helpful resource in analyzing the prospective success of the settlement program is the 
public forum hosted by the Commission on its website, on which practitioners expressed their 
concerns about the new regulation. See European Commission, Public Consultation on Cartels 
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by the maxim that the success of the direct settlement program depends on 
whether firms will find that the benefits of choosing settlement outweigh 
the benefits of litigation.
69
 Like an effective leniency program, an effective 
cartel settlement program requires sufficient benefits and incentives for 
both the government and the cartel participant, or neither will commit to 
settlement. ―However, the mere possibility of reduced sanctions usually 
will not be enough to induce a company to settle.‖70 Rather, the rewards of 
settlement must be transparent, predictable, and certain.
71
 
With these considerations in mind, the following analysis predicts that 
the direct settlement procedure will likely fail to produce the desired result 
of alleviating the overwhelming stress on the DG Comp, and will not deter 
firms from engaging in antitrust violations. 
A. The Strengths of Direct Settlement  
This subsection summarizes the author‘s view of two main strengths of 
the EC‘s settlement procedure. First, several of its terms represent the 
Commission‘s sincere effort to provide benefits to cartelists choosing a 
direct settlement approach. Second, it has possible long term benefits for 
global antitrust regulation.
72
 
1. Settlement Has Potential Benefits to Cartel Members 
First, engaging in the direct settlement process is financially beneficial 
to a cartelist that is not eligible for full immunity under the leniency 
program.
73
 Receiving a ten percent reduction in fines is economically 
sound when an adverse judgment is imminent. Further, engaging in the 
settlement process saves attorneys‘ fees that would otherwise be spent on 
 
 
Settlements—Comments Received (Jan. 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/legislation/ 
cartels_settlements/index.html. 
 This Note also makes inferences based on a similar settlement procedure that has been available in 
France since 2001. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, supra note 37, at 3. France has 
increasingly used this cartel settlement procedure. In 2007 the French Competition Council handed 
down five cartel settlements, representing twenty-four percent of all cartel decisions that year. Id.  
 69. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, supra note 37, at 9. 
 70. O‘Brien, supra note 15, at 3. In fact, members of the antitrust bar are skeptical about whether 
the ten percent reduction in fines offered by the EC‘s settlement procedure will be enough to induce 
companies to entertain the idea of settlement at all. Id. at 8. 
 71. Id. at 3. In other words, companies will not prefer settlement unless they can predict with a 
high degree of certainty how they will be treated if they cooperate, and what the consequences will be 
if they do not. Joshua, supra note 44, at 512.  
 72. Although the procedure has strengths, it will likely fail to achieve its intended purpose. See 
discussion infra, Part III.A.2. 
 73. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, supra note 37, at 2. 
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litigation and appeal. Settlement also cuts off the accompanying interest 
that would otherwise accrue on the amount of the fine during the appeal 
period.
74
  
Second, the settlement regulation‘s confidentiality provision75 protects 
defendant-companies from disclosure to third party plaintiffs.
76
 The 
provision expressly prohibits the Commission from disseminating any 
writings associated with the settlement procedure. Under this express 
protection, cartelists may initiate settlement proceedings without fear of 
providing a potential third party adversary with decisive evidence of 
liability.
77
  
Third, the direct settlement procedure benefits cartelists because it does 
not expressly require all parties to settle in order for any one of them to 
settle.
78
 This way, each defendant-company may make an independent 
decision about its defense, provided that the DG Comp is agreeable.
79
  
Finally, settlement accommodates the corporate culture of Europe in a 
way that leniency does not. In Europe, ―[m]any corporate officials . . . find 
it very distasteful to inform on their industry colleagues.‖80 From this 
perspective, corporate officials may prefer settlement to the leniency 
 
 
 74. See Morton Denlow, Settlement Conference Techniques: A Judge’s Opening Statement, 
JUDGE‘S J., Spring 2006, at 3 (highlighting the ability to ―contain costs‖ as an advantage of settlement 
over litigation). 
 Significantly, ―[w]hen appeals are lodged against Commission decisions imposing fines and 
penalties, payment is suspended but interest is charged and a bank guarantee for the amounts 
concerned must be provided.‖ FOLSOM, supra note 23, at 310. 
 75. See, e.g., Denlow, supra note 74, at 3 (explaining that confidentiality is a benefit of 
settlement relative to litigation). 
 76. Third party victims of anticompetitive behavior may bring suits for damages. Though these 
suits are less common in Europe than in the United States, they have been on the rise within the EU. 
Evan Weinberger, 3rd-Party Funding Fuels European Litigation Growth, LAW 360, Nov. 18, 2008, 
http://competition.law360.com/print_article/77298.  
 77. Though the EC has made efforts to encourage third party suits, ―[m]any of the victims of 
antitrust infringements seem to refrain from bringing damages actions.‖ Eddy De Smijter & Donncadh 
Woods, The Commission Green Paper On Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, in 
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2006: ENFORCEMENT OF PROHIBITION OF CARTELS, supra 
note 3, at 449. Therefore, even though the confidentiality provision of the settlement procedure is 
beneficial to cartelists, consideration of third party suits probably has little weight in a company‘s 
decision whether to settle or litigate. 
 78. An important drawback of this provision, however, is that the Commission must fully 
investigate and litigate the cases of the non-settling members. Therefore, the Commission is unlikely 
to achieve the efficiencies it wants unless all members agree to settle. See also discussion infra, Part 
III.B.2. 
 79. The DG Comp seems to suggest that settlement will not be available where some parties 
refuse to settle. See, e.g., Press Release, European Comm‘n, supra note 13, at 3 (noting that if some 
opt not to settle then ―the ordinary procedure‖ may apply to all parties). 
 80. Donald Klawiter, Corporate Leniency in the Age of International Cartels: The American 
Experience, ANTITRUST, Summer 2000, at 13, 15–16. 
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program to avoid the uncomfortable situation of disclosing the conduct of 
others in the industry. Rather, under the settlement procedure, parties only 
disclose details of their own conduct. 
2. Settlement Promotes Regulator Control and Coordination 
Another benefit of the cartel settlement procedure is that it allows the 
DG Comp to use its discretion in setting an optimal fine amount that 
avoids the untenable, yet potential, result of actually stifling competition 
in the name of promoting competition. Unduly high fines may cause 
insolvency. This could force a player to exit the market, thereby 
effectively decreasing competition.
81
 The worst result would be to replace 
a cartel with a monopolist, so that the unlawful cartel price is replaced by a 
monopoly price.
82
 The additional ten percent reduction in fines available 
under the settlement procedure makes this anomalous outcome less 
likely.
83
  
The settlement procedure may also benefit global antitrust enforcement 
by facilitating international cooperation. Today, cooperation across 
borders, especially between the European Union and United States, is 
necessary to effectively combat cartels.
84
 The Department of Justice (DOJ) 
has commended the EU on its new settlement procedure.
85
 Although the 
DOJ strongly prefers criminal penalties for cartel violations,
86
 it 
recognizes that the administrative settlement could allow for more 
effective cooperation between the two regulatory agencies in the future by 
removing procedural impediments to efficient prosecution of cartels.
87
 
 
 
 81. But see Motta, supra note 39, at 209 (dismissing concern as a myth). 
 82. Though this is a very extreme and unlikely situation it is a concern for regulators. Id. at 220 
n.31. 
 83. Some would argue that firms forced out by a fine are probably inefficient. To the extent such 
firms are forced out of the market, the overall economic effect is beneficial. ―Empirical studies of 
productivity show that it is the process of exit of inefficient firms and growth of more efficient firms, 
which make up for most of the productivity gains of an economy.‖ Id. at 217 n.30. 
 84. See Scott Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. for Criminal Enforcement, Antitrust 
Div., U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two 
Decades 14–15 (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/255515.pdf 
 85. O‘Brien, supra note 15, at 2. According to O‘Brien, though some current commentators say 
that a U.S.-style cartel settlement system is unique to a jurisdiction with criminal enforcement and 
cannot work in an administrative system, the ―European Commission should be commended for its 
initiative in recently introducing a settlement procedure.‖ Id. 
 86. See Barnett, supra note 3, at 144–46. 
 87. Unfortunately, it has been the case that ―a cartel participant seeking to cooperate and quickly 
resolve its liability will find itself on dramatically different timelines in the U.S. and the EU.‖ O‘Brien, 
supra note 15, at 6. ―There are numerous examples of companies that have simultaneously offered to 
cooperate in both the U.S. and the EU but had to wait years after settling in the U.S. to learn what their 
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B. The Weaknesses of the Current Direct Settlement Procedure 
The settlement procedure likely will not achieve its purpose of 
promoting deterrence and efficiency. First, settlement is not attractive 
enough to cartel members
88
 because the procedure lacks transparency and 
because it is unlikely to expedite their prosecution process. Indeed, in the 
microchip producer settlement, the actual process took an entire year even 
after all parties agreed to settle.
89
 Second, the DG Comp will not save 
much time or resources by offering settlement.
90
 Settlement will only be 
efficient in the unlikely event that all cartel members will uniformly agree 
to admit liability in exchange for a mere ten percent reduction in fines.
91
 
And if the DG Comp were to allow settlement for only select cartel 
members, it would nevertheless spend resources to fully litigate against the 
remaining firms.
92
   
1. Settlement Is Not Attractive Enough To Cartelists 
For settlement to be attractive, a cartelist must be able to assess its 
potential gains. Specifically, a cartel participant must be able to predict 
with certainty the consequences of settling or not.
93
 ―To maximize the 
goals of transparency, enforcers must not only provide explicitly stated 
standards and policies, but also clear explanations of prosecutorial 
discretion in applying those standards and policies.‖94 But with the direct 
settlement program, which gives the Commission a great deal of 
discretion,
95
 there is no guarantee that a firm will even be eligible. The fact 
 
 
fine would be in Europe. This problem is exacerbated by the numerous lengthy appeals of Commission 
decisions where, at times, the lag has been close to a decade.‖ Id. 
 88. Though in the author‘s view, the settlement procedure‘s ―lack of attractiveness‖ is a 
weakness, it is important to note that making settlement too desirable could have a negative impact on 
leniency. As the International Cartel Network points out, ―[Enforcers are concerned] that if settlement 
incentives are too high, cartel participants will choose to utilize available settlement systems rather 
than leniency programs, and settlements would result in a negative effect on the leniency program.‖ 
INTERNATIONAL CARTEL NETWORK, supra note 37, at 7. This result should be avoided because, as 
noted above, the leniency program has been instrumental in achieving regulatory goals of deterrence 
and efficiency.  
 89.  Press Release, European Comm‘n, supra note 13, at 3. 
 90. INTERNATIONAL CARTEL NETWORK, supra note 37, at 11. 
 91. See Regulation 1/2003, supra note 19. 
 92. See Press Release, European Comm‘n, supra note 13, at 3. 
 93. See generally Joshua, supra note 44, at 512. 
 94. O‘Brien, supra note 15, at 3. 
 95. ―The overriding principle of the settlement procedure . . . is that parties do not have an 
automatic right to settle their case and the Commission will retain full discretion throughout the 
process.‖ Reynolds, supra note 55, at 12. 
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that the decision is completely in the hands of the Commission could 
create an environment of uncertainty and mistrust.
96
 Such an uncertain 
playing field is not attractive from the cartelist‘s perspective since ―[i]f a 
company expends the time and resources to seek settlement, only to be 
told at the end that its settlement offer will not be accepted because a co-
conspirator does not wish to settle, it will not be pleased and its counsel 
may advise against engaging in the settlement process when representing 
future clients.‖97 
Also, the settlement procedure is not likely to resolve a cartel case with 
enough expediency to make settlement a preferred option to litigation. 
This is because a party seeking to settle must wait until the end of the 
administrative procedure to learn how its cooperation will be rewarded.
98
 
Only then will the DG Comp know to what extent the cooperation will be 
rewarded and the actual fine that could be imposed.
99
  
2. Settlement Will Not Achieve Efficiencies for the DG Comp 
The DG Comp will not derive significant efficiency benefits from the 
settlement procedure
100
 because even if the settlement procedure provides 
 
 
 96. An example from the U.S. highlights how too much discretion in the hands of regulators can 
create mistrust. Stolt-Neilsen, a former member of a parcel shipping cartel, applied to the DOJ‘s 
amnesty program. Stolt-Nielsen began cooperating with the DOJ, and provided assistance that allowed 
the DOJ to convict other cartel participants. But instead of granting Stolt-Nielsen full immunity, the 
DOJ revoked the promise of full immunity. The DOJ reasoned that Stolt-Nielsen had not ceased illegal 
activity, and proceeded to prosecute. Stolt-Nielsen sued the DOJ for failing to uphold their end of the 
bargain. The DOJ lost in the district court, and the Third Circuit reversed. DANIEL S. SAVRIN & 
BRANDON L. BIGELOW, THIRD CIRCUIT REVERSES DISTRICT COURT ORDER ENJOINING FILING OF 
SHERMAN ACT INDICTMENTS: QUESTIONS REMAIN ABOUT ANTITRUST DIVISION CORPORATE 
LENIENCY POLICY IN WAKE OF STOLT-NIELSEN DECISION (2006), available at http://www. 
abanet.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-crim/pdf/Stolt-Nielsen.pdf. Commentators have noted that this 
episode could be harmful to the leniency program. See Donald C. Klawiter & J. Clayton Everett, The 
Legacy of Stolt-Nielsen: A New Approach to the Corporate Leniency Program?, ANTITRUST Source, 
Dec. 2006, at 1, available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/06/12/Dec06-Klawiter12=19f. 
pdf (commenting that ―the Stolt case is a fatal self-inflicted wound to the leniency program and that 
leniency is no longer a viable option for a company because of the inability of the Antitrust Division to 
keep its word and abide by its promises‖).  
 The author proposes that any possibility of similar confrontation with regulations in Europe could 
chill the willingness of companies to cooperate with the EC. 
 97. O‘Brien, supra note 15, at 11. 
 98. Id. at 7. 
 99. Id.  
 100. An optimist might look to the positive French experience with settlement for the opposite 
prediction—that direct settlement could free up DG Comp resources and become one of the DG 
Comp‘s regularly used enforcement tools. In France, it is increasingly the case that regulators benefit 
from a ―domino effect‖—all firms involved in a cartel eventually agree to join once one of them has 
applied. INTERNATIONAL CARTEL NETWORK, supra note 37, at 11. But in the author‘s view, it is less 
likely that the same domino effect would benefit the DG Comp. One reason is that the French system 
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adequate incentives for some cartel members to agree to settle, it seems 
unlikely that all members will choose to do so.
101
 In fact, some may enter 
settlement negotiations in bad faith, merely to try ―to gain an advantage by 
finding out what their fine might be and delaying the investigation.‖102 
Therefore, enforcers are guaranteed the benefit of expediency only in the 
seemingly rare, best-case scenario—when all companies involved agree to 
settle the case in good faith.
103
  
C. Working With Settlement: How To Make The Procedure More Useful  
There are at least three ways to mitigate the practical shortcomings of 
the EC‘s settlement procedure. First, as noted above, a weakness of the 
direct settlement program seems to be that the ten percent fine reduction is 
unnecessarily restrictive. This may be easily remedied, and the procedure 
rendered more useful if, instead of a standard ten percent reduction in 
fines, the EC allowed parties to negotiate their penalty.
104
 Creative, 
individually tailored resolutions
105
 could make the program more desirable 
while still achieving the EC‘s expediency goals. Customized settlements 
also recognize the fact that cartel participants are usually not equally 
culpable.
106
 A less culpable cartel member should have the freedom to 
negotiate a smaller fine than the ringleader. Other terms of the settlement 
may also be individually negotiable. For example, in some cases, ―non-
monetary benefits such as . . . limiting the scope of the charged conduct,‖ 
could provide an attractive alternative to an individual cartelist.
107
 
 
 
provides a larger advantage than the EC‘s mere ten percent reduction-in-fines incentive. For example, 
when the French settlement procedure was first applied in February of 2003 to resolve a cartel of 
water-docking companies in Marseille, of the cartel members Guigues, SNEF, and Cochery Bourdin 
Chausse. Guigues and SNEF benefited from the negotiated settlement procedure by each receiving a 
fifty percent reduction in fines. Henry, supra note 41, at 23 n.47.  
 101. See INTERNATIONAL CARTEL NETWORK, supra note 37, at 11. 
 102. Id. at 17. 
 103. Id. at 11 (explaining that in the French experience, regulators benefit from settlement‘s 
efficiencies when all cartel members agree to settle). 
 104. O‘Brien, supra note 15, at 12. ―The more cartel participants are able to engage in a dialogue 
with the Commission in the context of settlement discussion, the more likely it is that a mutually-
agreeable resolution will be reached.‖ Id.  
 105. Denlow, supra note 74, at 3 (explaining that creativity is an advantage of settlement over 
litigation). 
 106. Scott D. Hammond, Former Dir. of Criminal Enforcement, U.S Dep‘t of Justice, Antitrust 
Div., Detecting and Deterring Cartel Activity Through an Effective Leniency Program 8 (Nov. 21–22, 
2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9928.htm (noting how varying degrees of culpability 
help ―measure[] the value of cooperation,‖ and factor into the DOJ‘s leniency decision).  
 107. INTERNATIONAL CARTEL NETWORK, supra note 37, at 13. 
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Second, as addressed above, the settlement procedure may not always 
be an attractive alternative to litigation. To make it more attractive, the 
procedure may limit settlement participants‘ liability in suits brought by 
third parties. The Commission expressly prohibits the dissemination of 
settlement documents to private complainants.
108
 But this does not 
foreclose the possibility of third party actions entirely because the fact of 
settlement amounts to an admission of liability.
109
 Although private 
actions have been rare in EU competition law, the Commission has 
recently taken initiative to promote them.
110
 If private actions increase in 
the EU, European cartels will be threatened with more significant civil 
damages.
111
 If participation in direct settlement allowed cartels to avoid 
some civil actions or liability, the program would be a more attractive 
option than litigation.
112
  
Third, the Commission could make its settlement procedure more 
attractive if participants, in addition to fine reduction, received limited 
liability in follow-up proceedings by national competition authorities in 
Member State courts. Currently, companies sometimes face additional 
time-consuming and expensive suits from national governments, even 
after the EC has resolved their case.
113
 The European Commission should 
 
 
 108. Regulation 1/2003, supra note 19, at 5. 
 109. Press Release, European Comm‘n, supra note 13, at 1 (―the companies choose to 
acknowledge their involvement in the cartel and their liability for it‖). 
 110. The major step in this effort is the Commission‘s working White Paper on private actions for 
damages in the EU. According to Commissioner Kroes, ‖[o]ur White Paper is presenting concrete 
measures to help ensure that [the right of third party victims to be compensated for losses resulting 
from illegal anticompetitive behavior] becomes a reality, and not just a theory.‖ European 
Commission, Actions for Damages, http://ec.europa.eu/ competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index. 
html (last visited June 21, 2008).  
 111. See, e.g., Motta, supra note 39, at 216 (including ―promoting private actions for damages‖ 
among methods for increasing deterrence).  
 112. To enhance the perceived benefits of the settlement program, the European Commission 
could pass a law to limit liability against companies that participate in the direct settlement program. 
The U.S. Congress enhanced the attractiveness of leniency in the United States when it passed The 
Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reforms Act of 2004 (―The Act‖). Scott D. Hammond, 
An Overview Of Recent Developments in the Antitrust Division‘s Criminal Enforcement Program, 11 
(Jan. 10, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/207226.pdf. The Act limited 
damages awardable in a private action against a company that participated in the DOJ‘s amnesty 
program that also cooperates with private plaintiffs. Id. Perhaps the Commission could increase the 
incentive to participate in the direct settlement program if settlement participants would be granted an 
assurance of reduced liability in third party actions.  
 113. For example, in 2008, the Commission found four elevator manufacturers guilty of cartel 
participation and levied €992.3 million. Shortly thereafter, an Austrian Court upheld a €88 million 
judgment against the same companies. Melissa Lipman, Austrian Court Upholds €35M in Elevator 
Cartel Fines, LAW 360, Nov. 10, 2008, http://competition.law360.com/print_article/76065. 
Coincidentally, the Austrian judgment marked the first use of that country‘s amnesty program. 
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consider a ―one-stop-shop‖ approach,114 allowing a firm to resolve a 
violation once and for all, if that firm cooperates with the DG Comp via 
the settlement procedure.
115
 
D. Beyond Settlement: How to Best Achieve the EC’s Regulatory Goals  
There are at least two ways to further advance the European 
Commission‘s regulatory goals. First, as mentioned above, the settlement 
procedure will not achieve the goal of promoting deterrence by alleviating 
the overworked DG Comp. The direct method to countering the problem is 
to expand the manpower and resources of the DG Comp. Such an 
expansion could be financed by fines currently being derived from 
antitrust violations, instead of using fines to offset EU Member States‘ 
dues.
116
 The additional channel of funding could allow the DG Comp to 
hire more people thereby obviating its use of shortcut settlement 
procedures to try to increase productivity.
117
 
Second, because the settlement procedure will likely not deter cartel 
formation and activities, the EC should consider imposing criminal 
penalties, especially prison sentences,
118
 on the individuals who enter 
anticompetitive agreements on behalf of their employers. One challenge to 
imposing criminal penalties is that the practice has not traditionally been 
 
 
 114. As noted above, from a cartelist‘s perspective the EC leniency program exists amid a myriad 
of as many as twenty European national regulators‘ leniency programs, all requiring separate 
applications. Klawiter, supra note 4, at 506. Neelie Kroes addressed this concern in her speech The 
First Hundred Days. Kroes, supra note 41. There she proposed that the EC offer a ―one-stop shop‖ 
system to benefit cartelists eager to resolve a violation, and to improve the desirability of the EC 
leniency program. Id. at 5. 
 In the author‘s view, similar logistical stumbling blocks that hamper the desirability of the EC 
leniency program could also impede the success of the EC‘s direct settlement program. France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom have cartel settlement programs in operation. INTERNATIONAL 
CARTEL NETWORK, supra note 37, at 39. Presumably, each would require a cartelist to file a separate 
settlement application in addition to the EC application. The author proposes that the ―one-stop shop‖ 
system Kroes proposed for leniency applicants would benefit settlement applicants as well.  
 115. The French settlement program has been successful and useful, partly because a single 
authority resolves the entire leniency application. See Henry, supra note 41, at 21. The author proposes 
that the EC settlement procedure would present a real advantage if it could provide a similarly 
uncomplicated and speedy resolution to all claims pending against a company within the Common 
Market. 
 116. See KORAH, supra note 7, at 472. 
 117. Id.  
 118. There is no greater deterrent than the risk of imprisonment for corporate officials. See Scott 
Hammond, Dir. of Criminal Enforcement, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, When Calculating the 
Costs and Benefits of Applying for Corporate Amnesty, How Do You Put a Price Tag on an 
Individual‘s Freedom? (Mar. 8, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/7647. 
pdf. 
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part of the European competition regulatory scheme,
119
 and some believe 
such a solution would be met with some resistance.
120
 Perhaps to smooth 
the transition from the current purely administrative regime, the EU could 
adopt a hybrid enforcement system similar to that in Brazil.
121
 There, a 
cartel is treated as both an administrative infringement and a criminal 
offense.
122
 This solution not only maintains the benefits derived from 
fines, but it also imposes criminal liability on those directly responsible for 
the decision to engage in the cartel behavior.
123
 The prospect of facing 
criminal penalties encourages firms to commit the time and resources to 
self-audit for antitrust violations, a process which has promoted 
cooperation with regulators.
124
 Thus the EU could promote deterrence by 
imposing criminal penalties for antitrust violations.
125
  
IV. CONCLUSION 
With the current economic crisis, consumer welfare is a crucial 
concern. Meanwhile however, the incentives for corporate officers to 
engage in anticompetitive conduct have perhaps never been greater, as 
they struggle to keep their corporations afloat and maintain their jobs. The 
 
 
 119. Wils, supra note 39, at 273–74. Wils notes that ―[t]o the extent that there is currently a 
tendency in the EU Member States, or even at the level of the EU institutions, to criminalize antitrust 
enforcement, this is undoubtedly inspired by US antitrust enforcement . . . .‖ Id. 
 120. See id. at 286–88 (describing the tendency in some European countries towards 
―decriminalization‖). 
 121. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, supra note 37, at 5. Notably, an administrative 
settlement in the Brazilian system does not absolve cartel participants from criminal liability. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Panel Discussion III: Public Enforcement (Administrative and Criminal), in EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2006: ENFORCEMENT OF PROHIBITION OF CARTELS, supra note 3, at 221, 
236 [hereinafter ―Panel III‖]. As a panelist points out, this approach asks the valid question, ―[W]here 
is the real liability for this . . . ?‖ and imposes punishment directly on the law breaker, not on the 
corporation and its shareholders. Id. 
 124. In the case of the banana cartel discussed above, Chiquita was able to apply for immunity 
when it learned of the price-fixing arrangement by conducting its own internal investigation. Upon 
learning that employees had shared price information, the company put a stop to the conduct and 
immediately notified European authorities. Smythe, supra note 43. 
 125. Though the subject of much debate, criminal enforcement of article 101 is legally possible. 
Wils, supra note 39, at 311–12. But see Reynolds, supra note 55, at 11. For example, the EU could 
require each Member State to make certain antitrust violations subject to criminal penalties. Reynolds, 
supra note 55, at 11. However, some observe that the EU has a culture that is less inclined to view 
cartelization as morally objectionable. Indeed, according to one panelist, ―In some ways [cartel 
behavior] is probably a way of doing business,‖ and that in some places cartelists enjoy ―notoriety.‖ 
Panel III, supra note 123, at 243. The culture against criminalization is further emphasized by the fact 
that in the EU, the individual is not even criminally liable if he provides untruthful answers to 
authorities. Id. at 224. Therefore, even though it is legally possible to criminalize cartels, it may not be 
realistic unless steps are taken to ―induce a compliance culture.‖ Id. at 243. The author proposes that 
the best way to achieve a compliance culture is by using the stigma of jail sentences. 
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Commission is right: efficient regulation and deterrence are proper goals. 
But the current direct settlement program is not the best way to achieve 
them.
126
 Rather, the European Commission needs to allocate more 
resources to the DG Comp so it may effectively combat the cartel 
problem. The consequences could reach farther than short-term failure as 
the European Commission‘s credibility in the community of international 
antitrust regulators could be at stake.
127
  
Molly Kelley  
 
 
 126. As the above analysis shows, direct settlement is unlikely to succeed. However, as Korah‘s 
view of antitrust regulation implies, it is unlikely that the impact of the settlement procedure can ever 
be fully grasped: ―[l]ike all antitrust cartel regulators, the EC DC Competition bureau faces the 
difficulty of never being able to completely quantify the effect of cartels or how many exists in our 
economies. This makes it difficult to know precisely which policies work and which do not.‖ KORAH, 
supra note 7, at 27. 
 127. If, as the author predicts, the settlement procedure fails to deter cartel behavior, there is a risk 
that the public and courts would perceive settlements as mere shortcuts for regulators that compromise 
justice. INTERNATIONAL CARTEL NETWORK, supra note 37, at 17. 
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